THE ORIGINAL SIN OF PROOF-THEORETIC SEMANTICS

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ABSTRACT. Logical inferentialists hold that the meaning of the logical constants is determined by the rules of inference which govern their behaviour in proofs. In the inferentialist tradition, one usually identifies the derivability relation of a logic with the logics (internal) consequence relation. This leads to departures from the orthodox Tarskian view according to which a consequence relation is reflexive, monotonic, and transitive. Our aim is to show that the inferentialist account of the meaning of the logical constants can keep very close to the Tarskian paradigm. Using the Blok-Jonsson theory of abstract consequence relations, we show how meanings can seen to be determined inferentialistically within the bounds of a reflexive, monotonic and transitive consequence relation.

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